Daniel Ostermueller L-SAW 2006

The world in which we live is defined largely by the interactions of sovereign states, which have dominated the international arena for the past 350 years, as well as other actors that are gaining influence, such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and transnational criminal networks. All such actors possess relationships that are constantly evolving due to the desired roles pursued by each and changes in the way in which information is communicated. Recently, historical events and responses to those events have brought a particular policy, which is neither new nor unique to these times, to the forefront of ethical consideration worldwide: preemptive war. It poses a fairly obvious dilemma to the international community: how can states come to an agreement with regard to their desire to avoid falling victim of an attack by an aggressor while still condemning aggression?[1] This paper seeks to address this dilemma by conditioning preemption in such a way that will promote peace and increase the legitimacy of the international system.

By allowing a specifically-worded provision for preemptive war, while adamantly rejecting the practice of preventive war, the international community will be charged with distinguishing between the two. States that pose potential threats would be referred to the international community for consideration, rather than be subjected to a preventive strike. This will alleviate the self-fulfilling prophecy of potential threats evolving into actual threats due to their fear of intervention. Further, the allowance of states to preempt a determined attacker will allay the fear of many states that a display of complete restraint will be perceived by rogue states as weakness and indifference to transgression. Preemptive war is based on a combination of self-defense and awareness of other states' actions. Its acceptance can create a compromise between those who refuse to be left vulnerable and those who do not wish to enable the international system to devolve into one in which those who strike first possess all of the power. Later in this paper, the United States' "preemptive" war against Iraq will be discussed in this light. By refusing to commit aggression without giving up military force as the last possible option, states will be forced to work together and share information. In turn, a context will develop in which they all possess the same rights and commit to the same policies. This in turn will lead to a level of interconnectedness that makes war even less likely and the achievement of total peace much more likely.

Definition

First and foremost, an important distinction must be made between preemptive war and preventive war. Preemptive war is an extension of a state's right to defend itself-an unchallenged facet of international law-and if it possesses credible evidence of an imminent threat, it should not be expected to wait for the transgression to materialize. Preventive war, on the other hand, involves action against a potential threat that has not shown a clear intent to wage an offensive attack.[2] Both require a judgment with regard to a rival state, but differ with regard to the interpretation of timing. The question separating the two is whether a state is in the process of planning an attack now, or if it might attack in the future. And this discussion is focused on states' actions due to the fact that the international system still treats states as the primary actors. Wide-spread promotion of international cooperation is determinate on states' willingness to concede most of their autonomous decision-making rights with regard to warfare.

One point of clarification is necessary here. The largest arena that currently exists for states to convene and discuss issues affecting the international community is the United Nations. Therefore, most discussions centered around improving global cooperation focus on the U.N. as a clear example of increased interaction among states, as well as for its potential to be a much more influential actor. Many look to the U.N. as a guide for international behavior and a bastion of international law. While this paper's focus is on the international system as a general conception and does not seek to promote the U.N. specifically, its influence as a justificatory guide to states is undeniable.

With this in mind, a very peculiar trend has arisen in which supporters of preemptive war have cited the U.N. charter's provision allowing states to defend themselves from aggression as a justification for preemption.[3] While this point is logically sound, as per the definition of preemption above, the U.N. charter specifically defines defense as a response to an attack: "Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."[4] Thus, while the U.N. specifically prohibits preventive war in the same chapter as the above quote, the phrase, "if an armed attack," demonstrates that the U.N. also does not authorize preemptive action.[5]

Just War: Articulating Preemption's Role

The case for preemption is largely an extension of Just War Theory, particularly with regard to jus ad bellum, or the determination whether to engage in war. According to James Turner Johnson, jus ad bellum is based on seven points of moral criterion: possessing a just cause, a competent authority, and a right intention, with a reasonable hope of success, the use of overall proportionality of good over harm, using war as a last resort, and operating with the goal of peace.[6] He further emphasizes the first three points, separating them, which dictate when war is just, from the subsequent four points, determining how the war is to be initiated. Just cause is the basis for mobilizing both ideological and physical attributes in the context of an injustice that has occurred. Just War Theory, in turn, is based upon the notion that states should always strive for a system that promotes justice and punishes violations of accepted behavioral standards, without using others' injustice as a justification for aggression as a response. This is how right intention goes hand in hand with just cause. Of course, these decisions cannot be made by themselves and therefore the government, which is charged with representing the will of its citizenry, must act prudently with its decisions regarding violations of justice and appropriate responses.

Justice in the international system is highlighted further by the frequently cited Michael Walzer, whose name has become synonymous with the distinctions between just and unjust reasons to mobilize for war. He has argued that there exists an international society of states that is governed by the laws of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The use of force or imminent threat of force constitutes aggression and a violation of the society's laws, thereby justifying a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the rest of the society. Therefore, the only justification for war is aggression.[7] The implications from this argument are clear: whenever there is a war, it is inherently unjust, because it had been instigated by one side whose own justification can never be adequate. When confronted by an aggressor, a state is then enabled to engage in violence, since conceptions of international justice have been ignored and the integrity of the state's institutions and the lives of its people are at stake.

Unfortunately, these articulations of justice in the international system have not become obsolete. Aggressive states have mobilized against others throughout history and the current world order is not devoid of animosity, greed, nor paranoia amplified by the apocalyptic destructiveness of modern weaponry. Just War Theory's parameters are confining and it is virtually impossible to ever determine the true motives of any state that goes to war, even if it publicly declares that it is abiding by the outlined specifications. The importance of Just War Theory lies in the fact that human beings have a right to live and states are charged with allowing that right to exist. Despite the pleasant analogies relating states to pieces on a chessboard moving back and forth, war is gruesome and destructive-both of human lives and the environments in which humans live. Without falling into a uselessly simple dichotomy of good versus evil, Just War Theory simply reinforces the human right to live, while revoking that same right from murderous attackers. In doing so, Just War Theory is staking out a claim in between the realists, who believe war should not be counted out from possible strategic considerations, and the pacifists, who believe that war is wrong regardless of the terms in which it began or operates. The international system embodies that distinction, favoring those who are attacked rather than ignoring the transgressions of murders.

In this light, preemptive war is a simple extension of the logic embodied in Just War Theory, as described above. If another state is in the process of mobilizing its military for the purpose of an attack, then that action is tantamount to a declaration of war.[8] Though a preemptive strike against such an aggressor will result in the victimized country physically firing the first bullet, that state is not the one responsible for starting the war. Though absent from the current U.N. charter, self-defense does not require a victim to be brutalized, but rather credibly threatened. The doctrine of preemption is consistent with the morality behind Just War Theory, in which the life of a victim is given greater weight than the life of the one trying to take another's life away.

In order to be effective, though, preemptive war must be defined clearly and with adequate regard given to its moral implications. Being that the goal outlined in this paper is peace achieved through increased international cooperation, we can look at policy implications from a Kantian perspective, with his cosmopolitan focus elevated from the level of the individual to the level of the state. Therefore, preemptive war must be defined in such a way that all states can accept its implications in practice as well as in theory. If there is not a clear consensus, the result will not be a system based on equal understanding, but rather a system defined by mistrust and malcontent. Preemptive war must only be undertaken when there is direct knowledge of an attack within a narrow enough timeframe that a referral to international scrutiny is impossible-days and weeks, not years. Also, the intention must be on neutralizing the threat and not attempting to categorically alter the structure of the aggressive state. Attempting such action would drift back into preventive war territory, which must be adamantly opposed by the international system. Instead, rogue states should be dealt with from a diplomatic perspective first and foremost, with a consensus opinion of the society of states determining its fate.

Perfect Information Problem

There are two significant dilemmas that arise from the promotion of a doctrine of preemption. The first is the problem of imperfect information: can a state ever be completely sure of another state's actions? Even an attempt to ground this issue from a theoretical perspective, this is not an easy task. Neta C. Crawford articulates this well when she writes that

"There is a fine balance to be struck. The threshold of evidence and warning cannot be too low, where simple apprehension that a potential adversary might be out there somewhere and may be acquiring the means to do [a state] harm triggers the offensive use of force...On the other hand, the threshold of evidence and warning cannot be so high that those who might be about to do harm get so advanced in their preparations that they cannot be stopped."[9]

The issue of determining the true motivations of an alleged "rouge state" is extremely difficult. Clearly, if a state has malicious intentions, it is in its interest to mask those intentions until the last possible instant before it wishes to wage an attack. No leader wants to be held responsible for allowing his/her people to be attacked, especially when preceded by steps towards armament. If there is an error to be made, would it not be in a state's self-interest to err on preventing harm rather than to allow its own victimization?

However, this line of reasoning would serve to justify preventive war-if there is a potential threat, the harm that could come to the victim's citizens supersedes any rights possessed by the rogue state. This may seem convenient to one state as it determines its own strategic objectives, but it sets a horrifying precedent when applied across the board to every state. The international system is still largely defined by tension, distrust, and animosity. Shooting first and asking questions later cannot become the norm in international diplomacy. Crawford writes that "the psychological reassurance promised by a preventive offensive war doctrine is at best illusory, and at worst, preventive war is a recipe for conflict. Preventive wares are imprudent because they bring wars that might not happen and increase resentment."[10] Though it is tempting for a state to place its self-interest ahead of the rest of the international system, doing so would create such a negative precedent that it would have actually made itself less safe overall.

Response to Pacifism

The second dilemma that arises is based not so much on the effectiveness of such a limited plan for action, but instead it comes from a simple normative question that is quite prevalent in many progressive societies: why allow for war at all? Especially considering how confining preemption in the absence of prevention is for any state to undertake, why not take this plea for international cooperation and peace to the next level and argue against warfare all together? As preemption has become a more conspicuous aspect of the popular discourse, a strong wave of pacifist arguments has surfaced against preemptive war. A very simple articulation of its argument is that war is inherently wrong, regardless of the circumstances. Thus, starting a war by being the first to engage another state could never be justified.

A sizable portion of this argument stems from Christian traditions that advocate nonviolence-one should "turn the other cheek" in the event of a transgression. Theologian John Courtney Murray has stated that

"The justness of cause is irrelevant...no individual state may presume to take even the cause of justice into its own hands. Whatever the grievance of the state may be, and however objectionable it may find the status quo, warfare undertaken on the sovereign decision of the national state is an immoral means of settling the grievance and for altering existent conditions."[11]

J. Daryl Charles makes a poignant response to this line of thinking when he writes that pacifists have taken up "a presumption against war and force in general rather than a presumption against injustice."[12] Other writers have taken pacifistic stances not for specifically religious reasons, but rather more general metaphysical considerations equating any sort of violence with a loss of personhood and the prevention of the ultimate goal in a person's life: self-actualization.[13] The pacifist position, while often galvanized by hawks eager to go to war, does create an ambitious conception for a more positive and peaceful world order.

However, the advocacy for preemption largely circumvents the pacifists' argument and achieves the goal they have formulated without running the same level of risk. If violence begets more violence, then the threat of violence can serve as the trigger to bring about peace. By chastising preventive war, but allowing for preemptive war, states are actively promoting the goal of peace by using diplomatic channels without leaving themselves vulnerable. Clearly the world would be a safer place if every state dismantled its entire military in an attempt to cease the spread of violence, but which state wants to be the first down that path? Considering that many states have, in fact, chosen to maintain active and technologically advancing military forces, there is far too much uncertainty in a world with such a violent history to take such drastic steps. However, by putting the international system in a position to mediate conflict, preemptive war can fall into the background as a defensive measure to be used only in the event of an emergency. By giving states the peace of mind that they would be able to defend themselves, preemptively if necessary, the entire society of states could make significant progress in reducing the propensity for individual states to go to war.

Preemption: Strengthening the International System

What has briefly been cited as the main motivation for this argument so far will now be touched upon more specifically at this point. From a conceptual basis, preventive war and preemptive war are greatly different measures based on differing motivations for both the aggressor and potential victim. However, as mentioned earlier, the practice of actually discerning between the two will be extremely difficult, especially considering the quickness of movement and the long-range weapons capabilities that define modern warfare. The question again arises, how should states respond? The manner that will have the most positive effect for the most people will be international cooperation. Engaging in preventive war may satisfy one state's immediate objectives, but doing so only makes other states more apprehensive and the system less safe overall. By rejecting preventive war, states are committing to diplomacy as the primary arbiter of disputes, not trigger-happy violence.

In turn, not only will states begin to be less fearful of each other, but the mechanisms of the international system will become stronger. States will look to international bodies, which can either be created from scratch for such a purpose, or incorporated into existing bodies should the consensus deem them sufficient, to monitor potential threats. Such a body will then give a strong mandate to the determined recommendations and the society of states as a whole could appropriate the provisions collectively. As Brown wrote, despite the temptations of pursuing a policy directed at achieving absolute security for oneself, "States should, as far as possible, try to act in such a way that they encourage the transformation of the world into one in which the effective institutions do exist, or at a minimum do not make such a transformation more difficult."[14] In light of non-state actors gaining notoriety, many states feel the urge to protect themselves from any threat to their autonomy. However, considering the fact that the world is globalizing, there will inevitably be interaction between states and other states, as well as other actors. In this vein, the choice comes down to whether a state should actively participate in this evolution of the system, or resort to isolationism. It has been shown that the former creates an order with a greater chance for peace, while the latter will only continue the trend of violence.

Humanitarian Considerations

One extremely important consideration that has been left out thus far is the intervention in another state for humanitarian purposes. While preemption here is defined as a mechanism for protecting the lives of a population within a state from attack by another state, many believe that the lives of populations within treacherous states should be considered with equal regard. Thus, a murderous ruler's transgressions against his/her own people are also grounds for preemption, but in this context preemption exists as preclusion to the decimation of a foreign population. This paper has not attempted to integrate humanitarian intervention with defensive preemption, due to the fact that the policy implications would be too great to grasp. Some feel that such a discourse is inevitable, that "the weight of the ethical pressures to limit sovereignty for the sake of the lives and rights of individual human beings is too great to be ignored."[15] Would it help more people to attack hard, military targets of a tyrannical regime, or impose sanctions, which are more likely to reduce the quality of life of commoners and not the elites?[16] On the other side, there are varying interpretations regarding when humanitarian intervention is necessary, as there is no clear guideline for when an intervention should occur.

This issue has been purposefully left unresolved, because recommendations in this regard would violate the key concern of this paper: the ability for the international system to gain relevance and allow for collective decision-making. The capacity for states to engage in preemption exists to protect states from an in-coming attack that is so pressing, there simply is not time to convene the mechanisms of the international system. An alleged humanitarian violation, while not necessarily less concerning than a direct attack, it exactly the type of situation that should be discussed in the international arena. As it currently stands, many individual states act upon their whims based on arbitrary justifications. If states took cooperative decision-making seriously and acted together, a state that came under the scrutiny of such a sizable contingent likely reconsider its motivations for acting as a rogue.

U.S. and Iraq: A Look at "Preemption"

One driving force that has brought so much attention to the discussion of preemptive war was the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS). Published in 2002, it was a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The administration believed that the most effective method to deal with the growing threat of terrorism would be to target the terrorists during their preparations and the states that harbored them. Instead of waiting for the terrorists to strike and conducting an investigation to seek out those involved, the U.S. would remove a terrorist threat before it fully materialized. In its own language, the NSS states that

"While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense (sic) by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities."[17]

According to Alan Dowd, "The Bush Doctrine's principle of preemption was tailor-made for Baathist Iraq-a country with growing ties to terror, an underground conventional weapons program, and the means and motive to mete out revenge on the United States."[18]

What must be acknowledged first and foremost about that NSS is its lack of a distinction between preventive and preemptive war. The above passage uses the terms interchangeably, though their differences have clearly been shown. While Saddam Hussein had proven himself to be a menace to his own people and a nuisance to the international community, the fact remained that Iraq had been crippled by U.N. sanctions was left out of the equation in the preparation for war. Reports have shown that Iraq had no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), nor was it in the process of producing any.[19] This is further emphasized by the fact that many of the Administration's claims had been repudiated by other sources prior to the war, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.[20] Also, there were blatant attempts to condition the intelligence circulated through the government's various arms during the march toward war. Mid-level Pentagon staffer Karen Kwiatkowski wrote that

"After August 2002, the Office of Special Plans established its own rhythm and cadence separate from the non-politically minded professionals covering the rest of the region. While often accused of creating intelligence, I saw only two apparent products of this office: war planning guidance for Rumsfeld, presumably impacting Central Command, and talking points on Iraq, WMD and terrorism. These internal talking points seemed to be a mélange crafted from obvious past observation and intelligence bits and pieces of dubious origin. They were propagandistic in style, and all desk officers were ordered to use them verbatim in the preparation of any material prepared for higher-ups and people outside the Pentagon. The talking points included statements about Saddam Hussein's proclivity for using chemical weapons against his own citizens and neighbors, his existing relations with terrorists based on a member of al-Qaida reportedly receiving medical care in Baghdad, his widely publicized aid to the Palestinians, and general indications of an aggressive viability in Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program and his ongoing efforts to use them against his neighbors or give them to al-Qaida style groups."[21]

Further, the Administration based key intelligence estimates on data obtained from prisoners in foreign jails, over which they had virtually no oversight.[22] Clearly, the Administration was not responding to an immediate threat, but violating one of the key components of jus ad bellum: right intention. The cause may have been just, which will be explored next, but the Administration choose to emphatically over-assert itself, rather than explore the diplomatic channels that could have mediated this conflict without mobilization to war.

Not Preemption if the War has Already Begun

One contention that many hawks have to criticisms against the Bush Administration's decision to go to war is based on precedence: Saddam Hussein had proven himself to be a murderous tyrant who refused to obey international law. Thomas Nichols wrote, "What makes the Iraqi case different is that the regime in Baghdad has signaled repeatedly to the international community that it is willing and able to launch repeated high-risk acts of aggression and that it will under no circumstances observe any nonviolent settlement of the demands made by fellow nations."[23] This argument is valid to an extent, but it lacks any weight due to the fact of the context that was made. The push for war was made in the post-September 11, 2001 environment in which terror was on the forefront of Americans' minds. Iraq was considered to be a supporter of terror and it was argued that it posed a serious threat due to its WMD programs.

The claims made by Nichols and like-minded thinkers would fall under a combinations of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Iraqi people and Iraq's violation of international law, as determined by the states that comprise the international system. As outlined earlier, these grievances have a particular place in such a system, as does preemption. However, the Administration used preemption as a justification and put the humanitarian concerns on the backburner. It stressed the strategic threat of Iraq, while diluting the importance of an "imminent threat" being the primary determinant of preemptive war, blurring the line between prevention and preemption.

Analogies

One of the strongest defenses to hawkish claims about Iraq does not rely on the retrospective knowledge that is now apparent. Iraq was undisputedly further along in the development of its weapons programs during the first Gulf War, prior to receiving U.N. sanctions and international scrutiny, but did not attempt any sort of biological or chemical attack against allied forces.[24] Nichols' assertion that Iraq would never abide by any international agreement fails to take this fact into his description of Hussein as without regard or reason. Many policy makers fear the possibility of another Hitler rising to power, unchecked by his peers.

However, the two often cited international instigators, North Korea's Kim Jung-Il and Hussein prior to the U.S.-led invasion, had operated largely within the constraints posed by the international system. A more appropriate analogy would be the Cold War: despite the notion of Mutually Assured Destruction, World War III never materialized. While many military-minded Americans favored wiping out the Communist threat before it would be able to overpower the U.S. and its allies, a preventive war strategy, diplomacy won out. Stalin died, greatly changing the face of Soviet politics, and Nixon transformed a potential enemy into a potential ally.[25] It is too late for diplomacy to win out in Iraq, but it is not too late to give up preventive war and attempt to bring the international community closer together.

Conclusion

The main distinction made in this paper was the differentiation between preemptive and preventive war. By allowing for the former and prohibiting the latter, states will force themselves to interact and cooperate at higher levels of intensity than ever before. Such a system of interconnectedness will surely lead to a more peaceful environment, for states will agree that prohibitions against unilateral strikes are much more agreeable than allowing states to create their own rules. This paper has not attempted to specifically define how exactly a strengthened international system would look or operate, because as it stands states are still the primary actors in global politics and they must decide how to shape the system to which they will subscribe.

This paper has also has not focused upon terrorism, which is the main issue that has stirred up so many viewpoints with regard to preemptive war. The reasoning behind this is twofold. First, several terrorist groups have already gone on the offensive, thus targeting these groups is not an example of preemption, but a legitimately defensive response. The concern to take from this point is how the United States should distinguish between terrorists themselves and states that harbor, support, and/or sponsor the terrorists.[26] This leads to the second reason that terrorism was not a prime focus of this paper, which is the allowance of the international system to decide how to deal with these issues, in the same manner that humanitarian issues were defined above.

The policy implications of accepting preemption and refusing prevention are a direct response to the policy of unilateralism that the Administration currently employs. Such actions may seem logical in the short-run, in that potential threats to U.S. security are effectively removed, but what sort of precedent do they set? If all states had the same preventive mindset, it would not be hard for a few countries to behave in a similar manner with the same justification, causing further destabilization of the international system. India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers and rising paranoia between those two should strike worry into every being on Earth. Iran and North Korea feel like they are backed into a corner as it stands, so what is stopping those states from going down swinging? Acting solely on self-interest is simply not sustainable given the age of WMDs and the U.S. can not expect its policy of, "Do as I say, not as I do," to last much longer. Proactively committing to building the international order, despite the small caveat of preemptive self-defense, will lead to the advancement of peace and avoid the advancement of paranoia and violence.

Works Cited

Betts, Richard K. "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities." Ethics and International Affairs 17.1 (2003): 17-24.

Brown, Chris. "Defense in an Imperfect World." Ethics and International Affairs 17.1 (2003): 2-8.

Byers, Michael. "Letting the Exception Prove the Rule." Ethics and International Affairs 17.1 (2003): 9-16.

Charles, J. Daryl. "Between Pacifism and Crusade: Justice and Neighbor Love in the Just-War Tradition." Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 8.4 (2005):86-123.

Crawford, Neta C. "The Slippery Slope to Preventive War." Ethics and International Affairs 17.1 (2003): 30-36.

"Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Charter of the United Nations. Articles 39-51. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

Dowd, Alan W. "Thirteen Years: The Causes and Consequences of the War in Iraq." Parameters 33 (Autumn 2003), 46-60.

"Experts: Iraq Nuke Evidence Thin." CBSnews.com. 18 July 2003. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/19/iraq/main564084.shtml

Fortune, Aaron. "Violence as Self-Sacrifice: Creative Pacifism in a Violent World." The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18.3 (2004): 184-192.

Ignatieff, Michael. The Lesser Evil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Jehl, Douglas. "Qaeda-Iraq Link U.S. Cited is Tied to Coercion Claim." The New York Times. CLV.53,423, 9 December 2005.

Johnson, James Turner. Morality and Contemporary Warfare. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Kwiatkowski, Karen. "The New Pentagon Papers." Salon.com. 10 March 2004. 1-5. http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/03/10/osp_moveon/index.html

Lang, Anthony F. "Evaluating the Preemptive Use of Force." Ethics and International Affairs 17.1 (2003): 1.

Murray, John Courtney. We Hold These Truths. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960.

"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." National Security Council. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html

Nichols, Thomas M. "Just War, Not Prevention." Ethics and International Affairs 17.1 (2003): 25-29.

"Report: No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq." CNN.com. 7 October 2004. http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/

Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books, 2000.

[1] Lang, p.1.

[2] Brown, p. 2-3.

[3] Brown, p. 2.

[4] "Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 51.

[5] Byers, p.11.

[6] Johnson, p. 41.

[7] Walzer, p. 61-62.

[8] Betts, p. 18.

[9] Crawford, p. 33.

[10] Crawford, p.36.

[11] Murray, p. 256.

[12] Charles, p. 89.

[13] Fortune, p. 187.

[14] Brown, p. 5.

[15] Cook, p. 821.

[16] Brown, p. 7.

[17] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. III.

[18] Dowd, p. 48.

[19] "Report: No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq."

[20] "Experts: Iraq Nuke Evidence Thin."

[21] Kwiatkowski, p. 3.

[22] Jehl, p. A1.

[23] Nichols, p.29.

[24] Betts, p. 23.

[25] Betts, p. 20.

[26] Betts, p. 22.